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INTRODUCTION
As rates of urbanization continue to rise in cities around the world,
there is a marked convergence in both the opportunities and
challenges for cities accompanying this trend. Much as economic
globalization has made cities into central players in the world
economy,1 so too has urbanization rendered cities key sites for the
*

Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law.
Albert A. Walsh Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 333–34
(Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 2001) (noting that “global cities” such as London,
Tokyo, and New York have emerged from the concentration of finance industries
that in turn impact each city’s urban forms as well as its workers and population-atlarge in a way that reorganizes prior capital-labor relations); John Friedmann, The
World City Hypothesis, 17 DEV. & CHANGE 69 (1986) (arguing that the new
international division of labor is organized through a class of cities designated as
“world cities”).
**
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advancement of social and economic development policy.2
Sustainable development and adaptation to climate change, among
other challenges, necessitate that cities and metropolitan regions
invent nimble approaches to a variety of local policies and practices,
such as land-use planning and zoning, housing, transportation, and
service delivery arrangements. As such, policymakers and scholars in
every part of the world have begun to look abroad for new ideas and
models to govern their cities as they grapple with changing fiscal
realities and increasing rates of urbanization.
As urban scholars, local officials, and policymakers engage in crossnational comparisons to assess different urban governance and
planning models, a number of pertinent questions quickly rise to the
surface. How can some cities’ experiences guide and enrich our
understanding of what cities in other parts of the world should or
should not do? What is the relevance of these comparisons in
determining what type of economic development agenda is more
suitable to a specific political and economic environment? How can
interdisciplinary tools be utilized to establish some entry points for
cross-national comparisons? What are the limitations of crossnational comparisons given the ways in which most local governments
around the world are constrained within a vertical system of legal
hierarchy?
Comparative legal scholars have long grappled with similar
questions and have developed methodological frameworks and
hypotheses to help us understand why some legal rules and
institutions travel and others do not, and to determine when it is
desirable for some legal regimes to converge and for others to remain
divergent. Even though economic globalization has shaped the ways
in which cities are governed, local government legal scholars have
only recently begun to contribute to the growing field of Comparative
Urban Governance (CUG), which has largely been dominated by
comparative political theorists, urban planners, and economists
committed to best practices for urban growth and modernization.3

2. See Nestor M. Davidson, What is Urban Law Today? An Introductory Essay
in Honor of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Fordham Urban Law Journal, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1579, 1592 (2013) (“What is driving the increasing salience of
cities and their metropolitan regions in the United States, however, is less that
demographic reality (which is mostly a function of the rapid growth of cities in the
developing world) than the fact that gridlock in national and state policymaking is
increasingly ceding to the pragmatism of local governance.”).
3. See, e.g., Alan DiGaetano & Elizabeth Strom, Comparative Urban
Governance: An Integrated Approach, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 356 (2003) (reviewing the
literature and major approaches to the study of comparative urban governance; three
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Importantly, local government legal scholars have identified and
analyzed the emergence of cities, including transnational networks of
cities, as critical actors on the international legal stage, shaping global
legal norms and the implementation of international laws around the
world.4 However, comparative analysis by legal scholars (and
practitioners) of similar legal rules and policies adopted by cities
around the world, although not uncommon, most often fail to really
engage methodological questions underlying such comparisons.
This introductory essay begins to fill what we perceive as a
prominent gap existing in the local government and comparative law
literature. The task to compare local government law is not only
daunting because of the extreme variation among local governments,
but also because there is the perception that such comparison is of
lesser relevance when comparative legal scholars have traditionally
focused on states, constitutions, or geographic regions. Indeed,
comparing the policies and practices of local governments may very
well require its own mode of analysis. In undertaking this project, we
realize that the relevant methodological insights for lawyers and
scholars approaching CUG derive from various legal disciplines. In
particular, there are at least three legal fields that offer insights, as
well as illuminate shortcomings, for those who engage in CUG: local
government law, comparative law, and the law of international
economic development.
This introductory essay explains the relationship between CUG
and these distinct legal fields through the rich contributions that were
developed for a joint session of the Sections on State and Local
Government and Comparative Law on CUG, organized by the
authors of this Introduction, for the 2014 Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools. Each Article offers an
innovative and thoughtful approach that links different strands of
local government law, comparative law, and international economic
development scholarship, while offering a rich menu for urban
reformers committed to rethinking sustainability and democratic
inclusion as integral parts of economic development strategies for
cities. Combined with the Articles collected in this volume, our aim is
to sketch out a methodological framework for lawyers and legal

approaches are structural, cultural, and rational actor approaches); see also JEFFEREY
M. SELLERS, GOVERNING FROM BELOW: URBAN REGIONS AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (Margaret Levi ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
4. See Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875
(2006); Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38
URB. LAW. 1 (2006).
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scholars seeking to understand or contribute to this growing field of
expertise.
The essay proceeds as follows: In Part I, we bring together a
number of insights from scholars writing in three disparate but, for
our purposes, intersecting fields, as we tease apart what might be
unique about comparing the policies and practices of local
governments, particularly city governments. This Part sketches an
outline of a methodological framework for CUG, drawing attention
to the analytical tools we believe are essential for lawyers and legal
scholars. Parts II to IV review the Articles written for this symposium
to illustrate how each of the authors employs the tools within our
framework in their study of urban policies and practices that migrate
across national borders. Finally, we end the essay by musing on the
important role that lawyers and legal scholars can play in the field of
CUG.
I. COMPARING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD
This symposium uses insights from strands of scholarship in
comparative law, local government law, and law and development as
a starting point to carve out a space for lawyers to engage in CUG.
This entails mapping a methodology or a blueprint to compare the
competing “legal formants”—the various actors and contexts—at
work in different local government regimes, and analyzing the
political, economic, and social stakes underlying each local regime.
A. Comparative Law Praxis
Legal scholars engaging in comparative analysis of legal rules and
policies adopted by cities to address urban challenges tend to adopt
one of two approaches. They analyze the impact of globalization on
local government regimes typically through either a convergenist or
divergenist approach.5 Work of scholars like James Kushner, a
contributor to this symposium and author of a major textbook on
Comparative Urban Planning Law, is characterized by a prescriptive
impulse in finding common policies, or best practices, which can be
used to solve similar local problems.6 Other urban scholars, on the
other hand, acknowledge the diversity and fragmentation of local
5. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Nadav Shoked, Comparative Local Government
Law in Motion: How Different Local Government Law Regimes Affect Global
Cities’ Bike Share Plans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 123 (2014).
6. JAMES KUSHNER, COMPARATIVE URBAN PLANNING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
TO URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE LENS OF
COMPARING THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER NATIONS (2003)
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government rules and practices under the pressure of economic
globalization and/or historical and geographical path dependencies.7
Comparative legal scholars have largely tread this analytical
terrain, although the tension between convergence and divergence
remains central to the discipline.
Nevertheless, over time
comparative scholars have developed methods and ambitions that
have led to important insights into these and other methodological
questions.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, comparative lawyers
perceived their role as actors and promoters of social change with
varying degrees of awareness of their actual involvement in
governance and politics. However, by the mid-century, functionalist
comparative scholars began showing a discomfort with politics that
altered the value of their seemingly neutral scientific approach.8 In
other words, at this point comparative law scholarship had become
largely insulated from the power struggles and the socio-economic
tensions embedded in questions of lawmaking. Some of the most
resilient concepts in the field were developed around this time—such
as Rene David’s idea of “legal families;”9 Konrad Zweigert and Hein
Kötz’s functional assessments of doctrinal and institutional
differences and similarities between legal regimes;10 and Alan
Watson’s now widespread theory of “Legal Transplants.”11 All these
were presented as products of scientific comparative law knowledge
operating within a deductive doctrinal framework and having little to
do with changes in societies, as if the legal profession was insulated
from the real world.
Since the 1990s, critical theory scholars have called upon
comparative lawyers to regain confidence in the realm of politics, and
to openly acknowledge the professional and academic commitments
that underlie their efforts.12 As a result, some comparative lawyers
7. See generally Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96
VA. L. REV. 1837 (2010).
8. David Kennedy, The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 345 (Pierre Legrand
& Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
9. RENÉ DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (John E. C. Brierley trans.,
The Free Press 1978).
10. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998).
11. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993).
12. See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985).
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rejected or called impossible the notion of legal transplants,13 while
others replaced this notion with better-articulated concepts of
‘migration of ideas’14 or ‘legal diffusion.’15 In dismantling the fiction
of legal families, for example, Jorge Esquirol effectively demonstrates
how this notion produced and consolidated standard images in the
law that bear no resemblance to reality but instead carry an
ethnocentric bias. For instance, the creation of Latin American law
ended up using one country’s legal system to generalize about the
whole of the region.16 Moreover, western-centrism embodied the
assumption that certain institutions and procedures are preferable to
the failed local ones that should be continuously reformed.17
With the challenges posed by post-colonialism and legal
globalization, comparative lawyers have put forward the need for a
more politically responsible comparative law discipline by pushing
back against problematic assumptions regarding the economic
efficiency of the common law at the expense of the civil law.18 They
seek a more structural approach to understanding how legal
institutions have a “dynamic, or dialectical, or constitutive”
relationship to economic globalization.19
Comparative law brings important insights to CUG, especially in its
ability to map formal and informal regimes influencing city
governance, as well as vertical and horizontal influences on city
power. Namely, comparative law methodology asks how local
institutions are reproduced by other local governments or how the
city becomes the recipient of an idea that migrates from a nation state
or international legal regime. Finally, CUG should resist the
tendency to valorize per se Western institutions and to rely on
“macro-generalizations” about legal regimes.20 Rather, it should
show how a variety of cities are playing a central role in the

13. See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 116–20 (1997).
14. See THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 2–3 (Sujit Choudhry ed.,
2011).
15. See generally William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 1 J.
COMP. L. 237 (2006).
16. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
75, 84–86 (2008).
17. See id. at 86–109.
18. See e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Syndrome of the
Efficiency of the Common Law, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 287 (2011).
19. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19
(David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
20. Garoupa & Leguerre, supra note 18, at 288.
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globalization of local government law since legal change happens not
because of a single social purpose, but through a multiplicity of local
and global factors, both internal and external, to urban governance.
B.

Situating Cities in the Global Economic and Legal Order

Although many view local government law as the quintessential
domestic field of law, economic globalization, coupled with global
migration, have turned cities into central players in the world
economy.21 Sociologists like Saskia Sassen have pointed out how
‘global cities’ such as London, Tokyo, and New York have emerged
from the concentration of financial industries to affect the urban form
of these cities, as well as its workers and larger populace in a way that
reorganizes prior capital-labor relations.22 The burgeoning literature
on ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities is important in the local governance
literature not only for highlighting the internationalization of cities,
but also for the critiques of the ways in which cities are developing
and being embraced in the new global economic order.23
If legal globalization has lagged behind its economic counterpart,
lawyers have nevertheless become adept at tracing how economic
globalization has impacted constitutional law regimes,24 legal
thought,25 transnational legal regimes,26 and eventually trickled down
to local government law. Jerry Frug and David Barron, in particular,
have demonstrated how cities interact with each other, through
transnational networks of cities, and with international legal regimes,
to become “independent international actors” while remaining
formally subordinate to state governments.27 As global regimes lend
autonomy to cities and facilitate their independence from the states
that endow them with legal power, these cities are in turn able to
shape international legal rules and norms.28
“International local government law,”29 as developed by Frug and
Barron, and others, furthers our understanding of what kind of cities
21. See Friedmann, supra note 1.
22. See SASSEN, supra note 1.
23. See Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 5 (explaining the non-prescriptive
nature of the initial authors, such as Sassen and Friedmann, and the more normative
position of later ones, especially agglomeration economists such as Glaeser).
24. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2005).
25. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 19.
26. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012).
27. See Frug & Barron, supra note 4, at 1–2.
28. Id. at 3.
29. See id. at 2.
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globalization is promoting while warning us against the perils of the
“private city.”30 As cities become more independent in the new
global legal order, obtaining voice and influence on the international
stage, they have also become prime disseminators of global capital
and the main promoters of private economic development.31 This
development, although perhaps inevitable given the political and
market forces at work, harkens back to a well-established tradition of
‘privatism’32 in the United States. That is, the privatization of cities,
under the gist of international economic development and
modernization, appears increasingly consequentialist in a way that
foregrounds market actors rather than city governments,33 middle
class rather than the poor, and shopping malls rather than public
spaces.34
While cities have become influential actors on the international
policy and lawmaking stage, it is also true that international law and
institutions increasingly shape the governance approach and local
policies adopted by cities around the world. As Illeana Porras has
argued, the “new intimacy” between cities and international
organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) is shaping the vision of the ideal city in ways
that are increasingly divorced from “the people” to whom the city is
supposed to be responsive and closer to the normative commitments
of these institutions.35 As international institutions play a larger role
in directly funding urban projects and attracting foreign investment to
cities, it is no surprise that their respective development agendas
become more closely aligned.36
This literature suggests that CUG, in comparing the local practices
and policies of cities around the world, be ever attentive to the ways
that international laws and institutions shape those policies and
practices. As cities become more autonomous actors, it is important

30. Id. at 4.
31. Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L. L.J.
263 (2006).
32. See Frug & Barron, supra note 4, at 57 (tracing this notion back to SAM BASS
WARNER, THE PRIVATE CITY: PHILADELPHIA IN THREE PERIODS OF GROWTH
(1968)).
33. See id. at 58.
34. See, e.g., Priya S. Gupta, Constructing Modernity in Urban India: The Role of
the Judiciary in Slum Clearance, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 25 (2014) (explaining the
transformation of New Delhi).
35. Illeana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable
Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 555 (2009).
36. See id. at 555–56.
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that CUG engage in questions of democratic and political
accountability to a variety of local, international, and transnational
actors. For instance, because cities have become the natural site for
sustainable development policies, CUG should discern whom
development policies are designed to serve and toward what ends.37
One question that CUG might address is whether the influence of
international and transnational organizations necessitates that
development patterns replicate themselves in global cities.
C.

Legal Reform and International Development

Understanding the important role that international legal
institutions can assume in urban governance, both substantively and
procedurally, requires some appreciation of the law and development
literature. The beginning of the law and development literature dates
back to the 1960s, when U.S. legal academics participated in
international development projects under the auspices of the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Ford
Foundation.38 These projects aimed to export U.S. legal education to
Latin America in support of efforts there to ‘modernize’ Latin
American legal education.39 The comparative lawyers and academics
involved in these projects had little self-consciousness about the local
perception of their missionary intervention.40 What marked the end
of this period of ostensible legal reform was a groundbreaking essay
by David Trubek and Marc Galanter explaining the self-estrangement
scholars like themselves experienced while advancing the Western
framework of ‘liberal legalism,’ which operated on assumptions that
were at odds with Brazilian, Argentinian, or Chilean realities in which
these scholars were asked to collaborate to bring about legal and
institutional reforms.41

37. Id. at 584 (“While political and fiscal decentralization, without question, free
the city from a certain degree of subservience to the state, the new ‘autonomous’ city
is expected to exercise its public capacity only to the point of ensuring a free market
environment amenable to private investment and to ensure that residents who can
afford them will be efficiently provided with good services.”).
38. See, e.g., José A Gómez-Ibáñez, Alternatives to Infrastructure Privatization
Revisited: Public Enterprise Reform from the 1960s to the 1980s 8 (The World Bank:
Sustainable Dev. Network, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4391, 2007).
39. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs I: The
Chile Law Program, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 481, 481 (2000).
40. Id. at 492–93.
41. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
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The second wave of law and development literature in the 1990s
was pervaded by neoliberal policies42 which sought to reform markets
and private law, rather than the public law regimes promoted globally
by the Washington Consensus in the first wave.43 However, the joint
focus of economists and lawyers to tailor development strategies to
neoliberal legal reforms began waning as a result of disappointment
with market shock therapies in Russia and Latin America, and
opposition to structural adjustment policies across East Asia with
active state intervention.44
The critiques of the Washington
Consensus began to take root in law and development strategies,
pushing those strategies to include civil society as well as human and
social goals in the post-neoliberal development agenda.45
The space created by the demise of the Washington Consensus led
to renewed attention to law in several forms, but, from our
perspective, with an increasing attention to localism and local
governmental institutions. In particular, the ‘New Institutionalism’ of
Douglass North aimed to foreground the role of government
institutions in regulating formal and informal markets so that ‘good
governance,’ meaning fiscal integrity and strong economies without
corruption, would take hold.46 Reinforcing this vision centered on the
relevance of property rights and Hernando de Soto’s work became
predominant in spreading the notion that informality was the main
obstacle to why entrepreneurs and land owners could not generate
new surplus from their hidden assets in the informal economy.47
Many of these goals have become part of the eight Millennium

42. We use neoliberal here to refer to the set of political and economic policies
designed to preserve free markets, private property rights, and free trade. See DAVID
HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005).
43. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in
Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE
NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 25, at 1, 6.
44. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Is There a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?, in
THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 41–48 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
45. See David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development
Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL,
supra note 25, at 95.
46. See ROBERT H. BATES, THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM. THE WORK OF
DOUGLAS NORTH, available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/rbates/publications/newinstitutionalism-work-douglas-north.
47. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2003).
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Development Goals (MDGs), which attempt to reduce poverty while
spurring economic development by 2015.48
The innovation to move beyond the MDGs, driven by the
economist Jeffrey Sachs, provided the foundational ideas as well as
key indicators that the IMF, Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), and WB later adopted.49 While some
have embraced this initiative, which offers indicators on how to
measure development, others have questioned the conspicuous
absence of the rule of law and human rights, and sensed that law has
become simply a technocratic tool with which to quantify and spur
economic efficiency.50 Some scholars have pushed back against the
formal neutrality and scientific orientation undergirding the idea that
law is neither shaped by, nor shapes, economic globalization.51 In the
same vein, they have shown the failures of de Soto’s assumption that
informality is per se a lawless regime, when informality is really a
result of legal regimes.52 For example, the informal sector is nurtured
where high cost land-titling causes de facto low-income housing, such
as in shantytowns in Panama City.53
CUG can contribute to these insights by showing how the
neoliberal development agenda has created specific features for cities,
like the rise of consumption and privatization of urban spaces,
gentrification, and the attraction of foreign capital through rapid
urbanization.54 Through the reduction of public spaces and the
weakening of the democratic ties between the city and the people
inhabiting it, the development agenda has replaced the inclusive and
tolerant nature of cosmopolitan cities55 with market efficiency and

48. See generally United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N.
Doc A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
49. See Thomas Kelley, Beyond the Washington Consensus and New
Institutionalism: What is the Future of Law and Development?, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 539, 547 (2010).
50. See id. at 550.
51. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM:
WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008).
52. See Jorge L. Esquirol, Titling and Untitled Housing in Panama City, 4 TENN.
J.L. & POL’Y 243, 245–46 (2008); see also Sheila R. Foster, Urban Informality as a
Commons Dilemma, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 261 (2009).
53. See Esquirol, supra note 52, at 249–50.
54. See Gupta, supra note 34, at 74–85 (explaining how the neoliberal
development agenda has operated in New Dehli through specific urban policies as
well as legal strategies such as the formalization of property rights).
55. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (2011).
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gentrification values that displace the poor under the rhetoric of
public safety, public health, and property rights.56
II. FROM FUNCTIONALISM TO LEGAL FORMANTS
The first hurdle for comparative lawyers is to overcome the socalled static method or ‘comparison by columns’ that is indifferent to
the law in action. The disregard of the law in practice and the
implementation of legal norms make this type of comparison
superficial, if not inaccurate, when the law in the books is the only
one described in each column. If the comparison by columns is still
dominant among think tanks, and even the WB, the problem is that
the columns portray legal systems as isolated legal islands rather than
as systems influenced by a broader legal culture, society, and legal
rationality. Finally, comparison by columns is under-selective and
limited to formal, rather than informal, rules resulting in an inability
to consider much of the reality of how law operates in practice.
What was revolutionary with the widespread use of the functional
approach since the twentieth century was that lawyers engaged in
comparative law research by addressing legal rules in practice, in their
context, without limiting themselves to law in the books.57 This
functionalist method relies on the notion that there are similar
problems that can be compared, even though these might involve
distinct doctrines of legal institutions in different legal systems, by
tackling the same functional question.58
A. Functionalism 101: Kushner’s Institutional Corruption
James Kushner’s essay, published in the Fordham Urban Law
Journal’s online companion to this issue, City Square, and his
pioneering work on CUG, have marked important efforts in tearing
down both the impression that it is impossible to compare this field of
law and the tendency to pursue comparisons merely by columns by
showing that similar local problems deserve a full-fledged functional
comparison.59 Kushner’s contribution to this conference sheds light

56. See Gupta, supra note 34.
57. See Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the
Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 677–78 (2002).
58. Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, supra note 8, at 100, 110–27.
59. See James A. Kushner, A Tale of Three Cities: Land Development and
Planning for Growth in Stockholm, Berlin and Los Angeles, 25 URB. LAW. 197
(1993); James A. Kushner, Comparative Urban Governance: Why the United States
is Incapable of Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 20 (2014) [hereinafter
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on how, in U.S. municipal governments, land-use planning and
regulation often appear structured to allow the maximum amount of
corruption possible. Developers and contractors are expected to
make political contributions to local politicians who possess the
power to block or facilitate development and public contracts. For
example, in Los Angeles there is an understanding among city council
members that they will defer to the council representative from the
district where the development is proposed on zoning matters, such as
variances, subdivisions, and zoning amendments.60 This allows
legislators to have free reign over the projects and facilitates
exactions as a price of development.61
In his comparison, the examples coming from the European landuse planning context appear to be welcoming attempts to ameliorate
these problems significantly. For example, in Stockholm, despite a
large legislative body of elected members that makes the decisionmaking process lengthy and complex, the system actually creates
more transparency.62 As another example, Germany requires the
government of the State or the German Land to be consulted and to
approve of significant local projects and plans.63 Finally, the
Netherlands requires shared decision-making between local and state
government in development projects, subject to the national
standards.64 Despite the seemingly built-in safeguards against the
kind of influence and corruption that private developers exercise over
local land use decisions in the United States, Kushner nevertheless is
able to discern that these European systems are still prone to
corporate capture in an environment of global competition for
investment capital and shrinking municipal budgets.65
In Kushner’s examples, it is not clear if each of the lauded
European solutions really advance his social-purpose goal of anticorruption, even if they advance other policy goals. For example, the
city of Stockholm was trying to achieve social inclusion, gentrification,
or decentralization of power rather than combat corruption when it
adopted its policy. The social-purpose functionalist approach used by
Kushner certainly narrows the comparison to a particular goal aiming

Kushner, Comparative Urban Governance], available at http://urbanlawjournal.com/
comparative-urban-governance-why-the-united-states-is-incapable-of-reform/.
60. Kushner, Comparative Urban Governance, supra note 59, at 22.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 22–23.
63. See id. at 23.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 24–25.
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to find ‘best solutions’ to important problems. However, critiques to
this comparative approach have shown that such a narrow framework
often collapses the distinction between facts versus ends, and neglects
the potential that best institutional solutions might not solve social
problems in different social contexts.66

B. Legal Formants at Work: Global Cities’ Bike Share Plans
As explained earlier, Rodolfo Sacco’s legacy in comparative law
has been the structural analysis of legal systems through the lens of
“legal formants.”67 These are not selections of a single social purpose
or functions in the law; instead they capture legal outcomes as a
product of conflicting forces that must be contextualized before they
can be explained. Thus, to understand legal norms, comparative
lawyers must understand the particular configuration, competition,
and compromises among the formants that produce them.68 The
structuralist element in Sacco’s legal formants approach highlights the
recurrent opening of a gap between declaratory statements and
operative rules—a gap that recurs throughout various legal sources of
each legal system.69 Daniel Rodriguez and Nadav Shoked’s insightful
Article in this volume, Comparative Local Government Law in

Motion: How Different Local Government Law Regimes Affect
Global Cities’ Bike Share Plans, develops a structural comparative
approach that bears resemblance to Sacco’s ‘legal formants’
approach.70
Sacco’s legal formants approach offers a dynamic understanding of
comparative law. In refusing the principle of ‘the unity of the law,’
Sacco insists that each legal rule becomes the product of the

66. See Fernanda Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 777 (2010) (explaining how positive-sociology functionalism takes
into account the context as well as the political choices made by comparative lawyers
in addressing legal reforms).
67. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law (Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Sacco, Formants
Part I]; see also Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to
Comparative Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (1991) [hereinafter
Sacco, Formants Part II].
68. See Pier Giuseppe Monateri & Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 531 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
(providing that, contrary to the liberal bias of the legal process, the legal formant
approach does not see equilibrium and commitment to liberal values in the process,
which is a complex set of strategies between conflicting legal actors).
69. See Sacco, Formants Part I, supra note 67, at 33–34; Sacco, Formants Part II,
supra note 67.
70. Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 5.
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interaction, competition, and struggle among the different legal
formants (legislation, case-law, scholarly work, ideology such as in the
Soviet legal system, etc.).71 Moreover, there is a second level of
deconstruction of legal rules that is relevant to each legal formant—
namely the disjuncture between the declaratory statement and its
operative rule.72 This structural method allowed Sacco to show the
limits of the deductive method and, more generally, to internally
criticize the dogmatism pervading post-WWII Italian legal academia
depicting its legal system as gapless and coherent.73
The starting point of legal formants is to show how the law works
in practice with very different outcomes. For example, even though
the French and Belgian civil codes might have the same legal
provisions, outcomes in these legal systems might be strikingly
different. Likewise, although Italy and France have different
declaratory statements in their civil codes, their courts may
nonetheless apply the same operative rule.74 Thus, the operative rule,
or the ‘law in action,’ determines the decision and is imperative to
understand. Rather than a fixed law on the books, the operative rule
determines the real content of the norm. But it is dynamic rather
than static, and it can change over time. In contrast to operative
rules, declaratory statements, which are purported explanations of
operative rules, can be true or false.
Rodriguez and Shoked’s project is ambitious and original not only
because of its rigorous structure, but also for mapping what is a truly
global diffusion of bike share plans in Paris, London, Barcelona,
Chicago, New York, Boston, Washington, D.C., Mexico City, Buenos
Aires, Taipei, Vancouver, Montreal, Melbourne, and Tel Aviv. Each
local government jurisdiction is not a unitary ‘black box,’ but is
instead dissected by the authors through an elegant typology of four
different axes mapping the source of cities’ administrative and
jurisdictional authority internally, vertically vis-à-vis the states and
other smaller levels of authority, and horizontally with other local and
regional bodies.75
The point of this exercise is not just a deconstruction of local
governments’ authority, but rather a powerful insight on the diffusion
and the successful implementation of urban policies ‘in motion.’
Through the analytics of the four axes of authority, it becomes clear
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Sacco, Formants Part II, supra note 67, at 343–50.
See id. at 350–58.
See id.
See Sacco, Formants Part I, supra note 67, at 23.
Rodriguez & Shoked, supra note 5, at Part III.
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that the most contested policies surrounding the implementation of
bike sharing plans, such as the process of the plans’ adoption, the
funding scheme, and the location of bike docking stations, will
determine whether these plans will be successful in a particular
place.76 The structural correlation between the institutional and
jurisdictional organization of local government powers explains the
triumph or failure of bike sharing plans in a city. For instance, the
authors show that after the initial decision to implement a bike share
plan, there are corollary policies, such as the existence of state road
safety helmet requirements, which can cause the failure of the plan’s
implementation if the city does not obtain permission from the state
to modify these provisions.77
The authors conclude with the ambition that their model will
become a blueprint for comparative local government law that will
enable urban planners, politicians, and lawyers to anticipate the
likelihood of success of the complex set of operative rules
underpinning any urban policy. Yet they also acknowledge the
limitation of their comparative local government method. Namely,
even their account does not fully capture the variation in legal and
political culture, not to mention history, that influence local actors’
ability to adopt and design policies. This limitation explains the
shortcomings of even a well-executed structural comparative analysis
of legal rules and institutional design without paying enough attention
to the path dependencies, histories, and cultures shaping each city.78
III. CONTEXTUALISM AND EXPRESSIVISM IN COMPARATIVE
URBAN GOVERNANCE
In comparative constitutional law, Mark Tushnet has powerfully
illustrated some of the main methods adopted by lawyers in this
discipline. While ‘normative universalism’ seeks to unearth the
founding normative principles of a constitutional order,
‘functionalism’ compares instead to the institutional design laid out by
the constitution. Tushnet refers to a set of more critical methods:
while ‘contextualism’79 is geared towards demonstrating how law is

76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at Part III.
Id. at 170–72 (noting the failure of the bike share plan in Melbourne).
Id. at 188–90.
See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND

SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3–17 (2008)
(focusing on the methods of comparative constitutional law as functionalism,
expressivism and contextualism).
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embedded in a particular society and history, ‘expressivism’80 reflects
the way nations use constitutional rules to define themselves. An
expressivist analysis captures, for instance, the ‘inward-looking’
United States and ‘outward-looking’ Canada vis-à-vis the deeply
contested question of capital punishment.81 In combining some of the
different constitutional methods from different nations, comparative
lawyers become bricoleurs.82 They also discover and debunk ‘false
necessities’—salient institutional, doctrinal, and ideological features
that emerge as seemingly necessary but that in fact may preclude legal
change in a particular context.83
Both critical methods—contextualism and expressivism—emerge
in Priya Gupta’s Article in this issue.84 Gupta situates the ongoing
jurisprudence of the Indian courts vis-à-vis property rights, the
relocation of slums, and the definition of city space in a broader
historical and socio-economic context shaped by, and in turn
contributing to, a global development agenda being promoted
simultaneously in Washington and New Delhi.85 New Delhi is a
global city where, despite the fact that globalization has created
economic opportunities for many, there is new fragmentation, local
resistance, and, as Sakia Sassen explains, ‘deurbanizing’ processes
through expulsion of the poor, surveillance, and privatization.86
However, Gupta sheds new light on the interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence. Her contextual and historical analysis of the
Indian city shows that the road not taken in New Delhi is an
economic development strategy that includes the urban poor. The
false necessity created by economic development and modernization
ideologies has prevented Indian courts from embracing less rigid and
formalistic conceptions of property to accommodate, as Gupta
explains it, “different lifestyles.”87
Gupta’s Article contends that marginalization of populations living
in urban slums is being accomplished legally through shifts in how
urban space, and its associated rights, have been conceptualized by

80. See id. at 12.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Tushnet uses this term to refer to constitutional borrowing in the modern age.
See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE
L.J. 1225, 1285–1306 (1999).
83. TUSHNET, supra note 79, at 14.
84. Gupta, supra note 34.
85. See id.
86. See Saskia Sassen, Does the City Have Speech?, 25 PUB. CULTURE 209, 219–
20 (2013).
87. See Gupta, supra note 34.
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the Indian courts.88 She traces the trajectory of this jurisprudence
back to a prominent 1985 case in the Indian Supreme Court, which
was a thin victory for the slum residents, based on the right to life
rather than a social interpretation of public property.89 This
jurisprudential turn is striking, she argues, if one accounts for the
historical context, specifically the Indian constitutional moment of the
1950s through the 1970s, in which early jurisprudential interpretation
of property rights promoted India’s legislature to pass laws to
redistribute land.90 Much to the dissatisfaction of the Indian people,
however, the land reforms failed to produce the economic growth the
state strived for.91 Consequently, with state-centric policies being
discredited in India, more modern policies gave rise to neoliberalism
in the 1980s.92 The reforms advocated by the government under the
leadership of the Washington Consensus included deregulation,
privatization of state-owned industries, and opening India to more
international trade and capital.93 It is through this more recent
history and context that Indian courts deny access to shelter to
indigent people and people living in slums.
Although Gupta’s Article does not explicitly undertake a
comparison with other countries of Indian jurisprudence regarding
property rights and economic development, it illustrates the kind of
contextualism that is a precursor to rigorous comparisons of similar
(or the same) legal doctrines between different legal regimes.94
Likewise, her analysis embodies the expressivist analysis of
comparative constitutional methodology, which captures the ways in
which places define themselves. As Gupta powerfully argues, court
decisions since 2000 which involve New Delhi have strengthened a
version of the ‘modern’ city that goes hand-in-hand with a neoliberal
development agenda in which workers in the waste management
sectors implicitly belong to lower caste communities, which makes it
increasingly more difficult for the most marginalized people to inhabit

88. Id. at Part IV.
89. Id. at Part III.A (discussing the Olga Tellis case).
90. Id. at 44–48.
91. Id. at 48–49.
92. Id. at Part II.B3.
93. Id.
94. In this vein, see a recent symposium comparing how the social function of
property doctrine was developed, codified, and implemented in strikingly
contextualized ways by different Latin American countries. See Sheila R. Foster &
Daniel Bonilla, Symposium Introduction: The Social Function of Property: A
Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1003 (2011).
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city space anywhere.95 In subsequent cases, the jurisprudence
continues to blame city problems on migrants and the marginalized
people in society and abolishes any settled expectation, or right, to
housing.96 When framing the actors of these cases, Gupta is explicit
about the expressive elements of the jurisprudence in the way that
courts label the residents of the slums as ‘trespassers’ and blame the
victims for their own lot in life.97 This expressivism is ironically
decontextualized due to courts’ unwillingness to examine the
historical, geographical and political economy characterizing the
circumstances in which informal housing emerged in the country.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN ACTION
Embedded in the lessons of International Local Government Law,
Andrea McArdle’s Article argues that municipalities now play a
prominent role in preparing for weather disasters and climate
change.98 Given the relationship that local governments have to land
use, infrastructure, public health, and safety obligations in cities, they
are the first line of defense in preparing for weather disasters.99
While municipal governments are at times vertically limited in terms
of their ability to shape policies or initiate legislation, McArdle’s
Article illustrates the ways that cities have acquired the power to
engage with international soft law regimes such as transitional
governance networks.
These regimes have proliferated as
‘information-driven’ ones100—endeavoring to share information, seek
collaboration for problem-solving, and develop best practices for local
governance.101 They are an important illustration of the move from
local ‘government’ to ‘governance,’ partly the result of cities’ new and
increasingly autonomous role on the international stage and
encouraged by international policymaking institutions.102
McArdle’s Article adds to the International Local Government
blueprint the notion that soft law, as developed by vertical-public as
well as private-public collaboration, opens up new avenues for

95. See Gupta, supra note 34, at Part III.B.1 (discussing the case of Almitra

Patel).
96. Id. at Part III.B.3 (discussing the case of Okhla Factory Owners).
97. Id. at 66–67.
98. See Andrea McArdle, Lessons for New York: Comparative Urban
Governance and the Challenge of Climate Change, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91 (2014).
99. Id. at 95.
100. Id. at 93.
101. Id. at 102–11.
102. Porras, supra, note 35, at 539–40.
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innovation and legal design by cities. The notion of soft law reflects
two major trends in the globalization of law: the striking
multiplication of producers of law and, in turn, of bodies of law, and
also the increasing privatization of legal regimes.103 Her Article
highlights the need for a more soft and horizontal approach of ‘cityto-city engagement’ in order to tackle climate change.104 This
approach will enable cities to take a more active role in the
prevention of weather disasters, and in shaping climate change policy
generally. Cities can become more active by developing networks to
adapt to changing circumstances and to allow for public and private
partnerships.105 Ultimately, these regulations emanate through the
use of soft law—goal and target-setting, data aggregation related to
outcomes, and information sharing.106
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40 C Group) is an
example of how cities have become generators of policies and
practices that “can spread and gain adherents among other cities.”107
The C40 C Group operates by congregating a network of the world’s
largest cities seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emission and take
other actions to decrease climate-related risks.108 These transnational
networks position urban governments horizontally, rather than just
vertically, and very much operate autonomously within an
international framework.109 C40, for instance, works in conjunction
with partners such as the WB, World Resource Institute, and
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) to
finance and support such initiatives.110 By engaging with these
partnerships, McArdle argues that cities are better able to participate
in the global response to climate change. Cities that face the most
direct threats from extreme weather events also carry the advantage
of being highly knowledgeable about local conditions, resources, and

103. See McArdle, supra note 98, at 102–03.
104. Id. at 114.
105. Id. at 103–04.
106. Id at 102–03.
107. Id. at 102.
108. Id. at 105.
109. Id. at 102.
110. For example, the World Bank institutes a metric to facilitate cities’ measuring
and reporting emissions and demonstrating progress in qualifying for financial
assistance for major projects, the World Resources Institute developed an instrument
to measure city-level emissions, and ICLEI helps develop a broadly applicable
standard for tabulating and reporting for measuring city-level emissions. Our
Partners & Founders, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/partners (last visited Oct. 17,
2014).
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vulnerabilities that must be considered in developing appropriate
responses.111
In a genealogical study of soft law, Anna di Robilant has shown
that its genealogy can be traced either to medieval legal pluralist lex
mercatoria or later on in the social tradition developed by nineteenthcentury jurists echoing notions of flexibility and organicism.112 These
genealogical strands, however, tend to obscure the distributive
consequences and the power dynamics that lie behind soft law and
governance networks promoted globally. By responding to this
critique, McArdle puts forward the limitations of her soft law
approach in explaining that “well-resourced non-state participants
will dwarf the role of local government actors and, perhaps, reinforce
dynamics of dependency among cities in less developed regions.”113
As to the underlying power dynamic, McArdle acknowledges that
these networks lack legal accountability and might be driven by
economic growth rather than a sustainability rationale.114
To tame the ‘growth imperative’115 spread by economic
globalization, McArdle’s hope lies in a robust involvement of cities
through democratic deliberation in transnational horizontal networks
pressured by civil society mobilization and commitment to urban
sustainability and resilience.116 We believe that such hope could be
furthered by empirical work showing how civil society is empowered
to put pressure on, rather than be coopted by, transnational networks
including other cities as well as private and international actors.117
Despite the important challenges that McArdle’s Article engages
with, her preliminary intervention is to show that horizontal networks
enhance the ability of cities to take independent action, to influence
policy, and to access valuable information on how cities around the
world are responding to climate change.

111. McArdle, supra note 98, at 113.
112. See Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499
(2006).
113. McArdle, supra note 98, at 119.
114. Id. at 120–21.
115. Id. at 120.
116. Id.
117. The Peoples’ Climate March (PMC) in New York City is a timely example of
civil society mobilization for urban sustainability even though some have expressed
criticism about popular involvement when backed by corporate interest. See
Jonathan Smucker & Michael Premo, What’s Wrong with the Radical Critique of the
People’s Climate March, NATION (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/
181799/whats-wrong-radical-critique-peoples-climate-march#.
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CONCLUSION
Among the central lessons of this symposium is the striking
influence of economic globalization and international development
trends on urban spaces and local legal regimes. The changes
triggered by these phenomena have opened new possibilities for
urban governance—from the legal diffusion of urban policies as
global cities begin to replicate each other to knowledge and
information sharing via transnational urban government networks.
However, the Articles in this issue also warn that public space is
shrinking as local government regulation is replaced by contractual
arrangements, and that there is a real deficit in public accountability
and participation.118
Take, for instance, what has become one of the most provocative
ideas of the past few years: Paul Romer’s notion of a ‘charter city’—
an independent city in a country aiming to reduce poverty around the
world.119 Charter cities would attract foreign investment and, like a
‘technological oasis,’ become a big attraction for capital flows.120 The
inspiration for charter cities, Romer claims, comes from the Hong
Kong and Macao transfer of sovereignty via long-term leases. In
2011, Romer’s idea was put in action by President Porfirio Lobo Sosa
of Honduras to form an independent or ‘model city’ with a very high
degree of autonomy that would foment development in the region.121
The President’s decree to amend the constitution to adopt model
cities was ratified by the Honduran Parliament.122 In the aftermath of
his parliamentary victory, Lobo signed a memorandum of
understanding with a private development firm, the MKG Group, a
consortium of investors led by Michael Strong investing an initial
fifteen million dollars toward infrastructure, to develop and run the

118. See Saskia Sassen, Visible Formalizations and Formally Invisible Facticities,
20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 3 (2013).
119. See Sebastian Mallaby, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Ending Poverty,
ATLANTIC (June 8, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2010/07/the-politically-incorrect-guide-to-ending-poverty/308134/.
120. Id.
121. Arthur Phillips, Charter Cities in Honduras?, OPEN SECURITY (Jan. 7, 2014),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/arthur-phillips/charter-cities-inhonduras.
122. See Decreto No. 123-2011, de 29 de Julio, Gaceta No. 32,601 del martes 23 de
Agosto de 2011, translation available at http://patrifriedman.com/projects/fcd/
RED%20Legislation%20-%20Official%20English%20Translation.pdf
(modifying
Article 329 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, which authorizes the
creation of Special Development Regions (SDR’s)).
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areas.123 However the MKG Group’s vision of the model city was
different from the diverse city of ten million people that Romer had
in mind, as the Group envisioned the building of few factories that
employed a few hundred thousand people that would attract investors
due to low taxes and low wages.124
Even though the Honduras model city decree was not a formal
cession of territory, the responsibility for the legal regime was
contracted out to a corporate entity that would administer civil and
criminal matters through an independent commission, using as a court
of appeal the Supreme Court of Mauritius.125 This would be a
nightmare for contemporary comparative constitutional lawyers to
imagine, considering that the Supreme Court of Mauritius has
absolutely no contextual or expressive understanding of what
happens in the model city in Honduras and yet must interpret the law
and the constitutional rights of people that are not living in its
territory. Not surprisingly, in 2012 the Honduran Supreme Court
declared the decree unconstitutional because the grant of legal
authority to the Special Development Regions—in exchange of the
future possibility of economic development—was in violation of the
“territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Honduran
State.”126 In 2013, the Honduran legislature again overwhelmingly
passed another bill that would allow autonomously governed cities on
its territory.127 At this point, Paul Romer distanced himself from the
project and its role in a governmental commission, which, after a
number of years, would transfer its full authority to the city’s
residents.128
Beyond the fact that Romer’s idea was transplanted in Honduras
by an alleged corrupt administration, this action was witness to the
creation of what Frug and Barron call the ‘private city’—one in which
the authority over residents, rather than citizens, was exercised by
independent commissions, a corporate board and a foreign supreme

123. See Maxim Lott, Private City in Honduras Will Have Minimal Taxes,
Government, FOX NEWS (Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/09/11/
private-city-in-honduras-will-have-minimal-taxes-government/.
124. Mallaby, supra note 119.
125. See Steven Press, Honduran Model-Cities: A Historical Perspective,
CENTERPIECE, Fall 2012, at 6, available at http://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/
cpfall2012.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Honduras Once Again Passes ‘Model Cities’ Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan.
23, 2013, 11:17 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/honduras-once-again-passes-modelcities-law.
128. See Phillips, supra note 121.
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The story embodies the prediction of the “Jewish
question
about the changing nature of the participants to our civil
society. These have become abstract citizens instead of real human
beings who are politically committed to participate and shape a
democracy. In charter cities, the abstract citizen who is a mere
resident rather than a participant in government and governance of
her space has no political rights because the territory no longer
includes a public sphere.
In our symposium, the important role of lawyers in CUG has
emerged in different ways. Gupta’s work shows how lawyers are able
to reject false necessities in the framing of formal property rights that
reserve the construction of urban spaces for middle and upper classes
while excluding the poor. The lesson of the Honduras charter city
teaches us that comparative urban governance requires not only
economists and urban planners, but most importantly lawyers who
can develop original blueprints to compare local government laws in
the case of Rodriguez and Shoked’s contribution, and, as McArdle
demonstrates, share knowledge through transnational horizontal
networks that build cities’ capacity to grow sustainably and
democratically.
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129. Frug & Barron, supra note 4, at 3.
130. See Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26,
26–52 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978). For an insightful application of the young
Marx’s insights to U.S. local government law, see Kenneth A. Stahl, Local
Government, “One Person, One Vote,” and the Jewish Question, 49 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (2014).

